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FOREWORD
Much work in cybersecurity is focused on the problems of making specific 
systems more secure and well behaved. Doing that is clearly very important. 
However, just as treating sick patients one at a time is not sufficient to stop 
the spread of an epidemic, patching or improving the design of individual 
software systems one at a time is almost certainly not sufficient to produce 
wide‑spread cybersecurity. 
Medical doctors can make important contributions, but preventing, slowing 
and stopping epidemics is the domain of public health—the creation of an 
entire environment designed to promote sanitary practice and provide pro‑
tection at the level of a community.
Drawing this parallel, in 2011, Deirdre K. Mulligan, then an Assistant Pro‑
fessor in the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley 
and Fred B. Schneider, the Samuel B. Eckert Professor and Chairman of the 
Department of Computer Science at Cornell University, argued that achieving 
widespread cybersecurity required a similar general community approach. 
They elaborated this argument in a paper titled “Doctrine for Cybersecurity” 
in Dædalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science.
Building on the metaphor of public health, Mulligan and Schneider argued 
that individual strategies (standards, adherence to good practice in software 
engineering, formal methods, red/green machines, filters and firewalls, etc.) 
are all valid, but, as with health, there are aspects of cybersecurity that are a 
“public good”. They went on to outline a range of strategies, some technical 
but others behavioral, educational or legal, that they believed necessary to 
create an effective “doctrine for cybersecurity.”
In order to make these ideas more widely available to the risk governance 
community IRGC invited Fred Schneider, Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre 
Mulligan to summarize and elaborate their ideas in this short opinion piece 
titled Public Cybersecurity and Rationalizing Information Sharing. We hope 
readers will find their ideas as useful and stimulating as we have at IRGC.
 M. Granger Morgan
 Chair, Scientific and Technical Council, IRGC Foundation
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Cyber‑technology and associated cybersecurity are 
today central to our economic and social lives. Secure 
systems contribute to creating a sense of confidence 
that the technologies and processes aimed at improving 
performance and welfare will not endanger data privacy, 
confidentiality, integrity or availability—areas of value 
both to people and businesses.
There are conflicting views about what cybersecurity 
entails and how information sharing can promote it. 
Questions also include how to protect individual interests 
and other social values, and how to prioritize what is 
important in information sharing arrangements.
The lack of a clear framework under which information 
sharing proposals can be evaluated, increases the 
controversy around them. For example, the recently 
enacted U.S. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 contains 
many cybersecurity information sharing provisions 
and mandates, yet it fails to connect them to specific 
cybersecurity goals. There is an absence of any clear 
objectives. The new sharing initiatives have been met with 
skepticism as to their utility and, additionally, objections 
have been raised based on the newly created risks to 
privacy. The new European Network and Information 
Security (NIS) Directive 1 that establishes a compulsory 
incident reporting scheme for operators of essential 
services to collect evidence about cyberattacks and other 
breaches has also been greeted with concern because 
some industry players fear that it will force them into 
releasing confidential information. In both contexts, 
advocates of information sharing are hampered by a 
failure to tie information sharing generally and specifically 
to the advancement of particular cybersecurity goals. 
In the midst of the debate about the trade‑offs that 
governments, businesses, and individuals ought to make, 
the idea that cybersecurity should be understood as a 
public good suggests both the need and the approach 
to clarifying cybersecurity goals, as well as a way to 
ground conversations about information sharing and 
other policies. 
PREFACE BY IRGC
Public goods include fresh air, national security, and 
public health. Public goods are non‑excludable and non‑
rivalrous. They are to be maintained or developed at a 
societal level. The concept is an economic concept, not 
a value judgment. Applied to public health, it justifies the 
allocation of public resources to prevention and ongoing 
efforts to manage disease, and the data collection and 
other intrusions on individual interests necessary to the 
benefit of all. In the field of cybersecurity, it suggests that 
there is a collective responsibility to develop cybersecurity 
and manage cyber‑insecurity, and that doing so requires 
a shared perspective on what cybersecurity entails—
who and what should be protected—and when and 
under what circumstances its pursuit can cause harm 
or prejudice to individuals or other national priorities, such 
as innovation. This framing provides a way to evaluate 
information sharing proposals. 
If, like public health, cybersecurity is considered a public 
good, which has to be protected and developed with 
established high‑level principles and criteria, then it 
may be that some of the trade‑offs mentioned above 
would be easier to resolve, at least at a national policy 
level. IRGC is not convinced this is true, but we pose 
the question. Establishing cybersecurity as a public 
good would create the overarching policy principle to 
define goals and means, to bring cohesion to sectoral 
and specific, purpose-led policies and programs. It 
would also suggest that it is important to pursue both 
international collaboration in harmonizing technical 
choices and institutional and regulatory measures.
With this objective in mind IRGC invited Prof. Fred 
Schneider, Elaine Sedenberg and Prof. Deirdre K. 
Mulligan to write an opinion piece for publication by 
IRGC. We proffer our sincere thanks to them for their 
valuable contribution.
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IRGC opinion pieces
IRGC opinion pieces are authored papers that reflect the 
opinion of recognized scientists on governance issues. 
They are sometimes controversial because of the topics 
they discuss. In providing such opinion pieces IRGC’s 
intention is to trigger a discussion between scientists 
and policymakers on possible scientific or governance 
approaches that might contribute to solving a current 
risk and governance problem.
IRGC’s initiative on cyber risk governance
During 2015 IRGC conducted two workshops to explore 
issues of cybersecurity. The first, organized by Professor 
Granger Morgan and held in Washington DC on May 
28‑29, compared methods for assessing terrorism risk 
with those for cybersecurity and explored the potential 
for each field to learn from the other. Our deliberations in 
this workshop were informed by the public health model 
and related ideas advanced by Mulligan and Schneider. 
The second workshop, on cybersecurity risk governance, 
was held at the Swiss Re Centre for Global Dialogue, 
Zurich, Switzerland on October 29‑30. It focused in 
greater detail on the private sector and discussed the 
changing cyber threat landscape, various techniques 
for improving cybersecurity, and methods for dealing 
with the residual risk while focusing on quantification 
and transfer to insurance.
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1.  Introduction
Achieving any specific level of cybersecurity inevitably entails making com‑
promises with regard to cost, function, and convenience, as well as trade‑offs 
between societal values, such as openness, privacy, freedom of expression, 
and innovation. In defining regulations and incentives, decisions have to be 
made about how to balance these trade‑offs while optimizing security out‑
comes. To further complicate matters, neither technologists nor policymakers 
have the luxury of starting with a clean slate. Instead they work within the 
shadows of legacy networks and end systems that are neither secure, nor 
easily made so. Moreover, current security postures often reflect societal 
values from a time when dependence on networked information systems 
was minimal.
A cybersecurity doctrine prescribes a set of goals, a basis for making trade‑
offs among these goals, and various means to achieve the goals. Its utility is 
determined, in part, by the extent to which it offers a framework for achieving 
goals without imposing, ignoring, or ruling out possible technical or policy 
solutions. And the value of cybersecurity doctrines per se is measured by the 
extent to which they bring clarity to policy questions and proposed incentives.
The Doctrine of Public Cybersecurity 2 has as its goals the production of 
security and the management of its absence. The doctrine derives from the 
observation that cybersecurity is non‑rivalrous and non‑excludable and, 
thus, satisfies the definition of a public good. Cybersecurity is non‑rivalrous, 
since one user benefiting from the security of a networked system does 
not diminish the ability of any other user to benefit from the security of that 
system; it is non‑excludable, because users of a secure system cannot be 
excluded easily from benefits security brings.
Notice that the Doctrine of Public Cybersecurity targets the collective rather 
than any single individual’s or entity’s computer, network, or assets. Also, it 
steers policy makers away from deterrence‑oriented strategies (“doctrines of 
accountability”) reflected in current criminal law, doing so because deterrence 
does little to encourage investments in the production of cybersecurity or in 
managing its absence.
This paper briefly explores how information sharing fits into the Doctrine 
of Public Cybersecurity and how laws and policies around these activities 
can be tailored to promote security with limited intrusions on privacy and 
autonomy.3 Some in the U.S. and elsewhere have argued that information 
sharing is an attractive means for supporting cybersecurity; others worry 
that compromises to societal values (such as privacy) seem inevitable. This 
paper revisits the Doctrine of Public Cybersecurity in order to shed light 
on debates about information sharing, by exploring its potential utility, and 
considering policies to mitigate its impact on other societal values.4 Its goal 
is not to advocate for the creation of specific institutions (government or 
otherwise), but rather to explore the potential utility of information sharing 
to promote public cybersecurity.
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2.  In Analogy  
with Public Health
Public health—the prevention of disease and promotion of good health in 
populations writ large—is a public good. It is non‑rivalrous since having the 
population healthy implies a lower prevalence of disease which, in turn, de‑
creases the chances that any member can fall ill. And it is non‑excludable, 
because nobody can limit an individual’s ability to profit from the health ben‑
efits that living among a healthy population brings. Public health law focuses 
on the health of the population as a whole and the singular responsibility of 
government in that enterprise.
Public health and cybersecurity are both thus public goods that aim to 
achieve a positive state (health or security) in a loosely affiliated but highly 
interdependent network. With one, it is a network of people existing in an 
environment over which they have some limited control; with the other, the 
network comprises people, software, and hardware (for communications, 
storage, and processing). And because the sought‑after positive state is 
ultimately unachievable, public health and public cybersecurity must struggle 
with how to manage its absence as well as with how to prompt its produc‑
tion. Success ultimately depends not only on technical progress but also 
on reaching a political agreement about (i) the relative value of some public 
good in comparison to other societal values and (ii) the institutions’ granted 
authority to resolve conflicts (and the methods they use).
Just as with public health, ensuring that actors contribute to public cyberse‑
curity requires interventions to overcome positive and negative externalities 
that lead rational individuals to underinvest. When incentives are insufficient to 
prompt private provisioning, the public interest requires making value‑ridden 
choices to interfere with the rights and interests of individuals and organ‑
izations. Those choices would be embodied in goals that reflect political 
agreement about the good in question, the socially desirable level, given 
competing priorities and values, and provisions for determining when the 
individual’s desires yield to the collective’s need. For example, an agreement 
might stipulate that state coercion is permitted only when certain incursions 
into the rights and interests of individuals are tightly circumscribed.
The analogy with public health inspires cybersecurity measures like preven‑
tion, containment, mitigation, and recovery—strategies that direct resources 
toward production and preservation of cybersecurity 5.  Modern public health 
doctrine does not compensate victims of disease so, by analogy, a doctrine 
of public cybersecurity would not focus on restitution. Indeed, restitution is 
economically efficient only if you assume attacks are infrequent, and that 
assumption is not realistic today. Quarantine, in response to disease, benefits 
the collective by limiting the spread of disease. It does so by depriving an 
individual of certain freedoms. By analogy, a doctrine of public cybersecurity 
would dictate responses that deprive individuals of actions, but only if those 
responses benefit the collective. Punishments solely for retribution would 
not be part of a public cybersecurity doctrine (since retribution does not 
benefit public welfare). Finally, the parallel with public health also suggests 
that prevention should be preferred to recovery.
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Some express reservations about making an analogy between cybersecurity 
and public health. These reservations stem from the role that an intelligent, 
sentient adversary plays in undermining cybersecurity (which is largely absent 
from public health, though possible through bioterrorism, and at a smaller 
scale through intentional transmission of communicable diseases which, while 
rarely seen, has occurred at the individual and nation‑state level). Pathogens 
do evolve biologically and adapt to environmental changes or take advantage 
of changing social structures (e.g., rapid spreading through urbanization, or 
growing antibiotic resistance from prescription overuse). Although motivated 
by survival rather than by a desire to maximize damage, the evolution of 
pathogens nevertheless embodies the same type of an arms race we see with 
cybersecurity and development of malware, which, once created or improved 
by a human, spreads in a rapid, non‑sentient fashion. So, motives differ and 
intelligence in the narrow sense is lacking, but in both domains the public 
good is subject to a constantly changing set of new exploits from adversaries.
Moreover, focusing only on the sentience of an adversary misses the point: 
preventative techniques are effective, regardless of motive. This can be 
seen in public health examples such as vaccination and condom use. While 
intentionally spreading a disease is relatively uncommon, individuals know‑
ingly have exposed others to HIV. Condoms nevertheless are an effective 
preventative measure against such hostile acts and vaccines increase herd 
immunity, lowering the risk of infection. Similarly within cybersecurity, auto‑
mated software platforms for launching cyberattacks can be purchased on 
the black market to intentionally spread and infect targets. However, similar 
to preventative techniques like condoms, patching vulnerabilities or limiting 
a user’s downloads are effective against these attack engines, regardless of 
the capabilities (or lack of sentience) in the automation. In short, adversarial 
considerations are simply less relevant when dealing with prevention and 
risk management orientations—in contrast to deterrence‑oriented strategies, 
which are focused on intent—because harms manifest, and protections work, 
regardless of intent.
Still, caution is advised when invoking the analogy between health and cyber‑
security. We have no qualms about using the analogy for inspiration, but we 
are reluctant about advocating adoption of a means or strategy from public 
health until it has been evaluated anew relative to public cybersecurity’s 
stated goals: producing cybersecurity or managing its absence.
3. Monitoring and Information Sharing 
to Support Public Health
Public health decidedly benefits from collecting and sharing information about 
the health of a population and the spread of epidemics. This collection and 
sharing aids in:
• Determination of the origin or current sources of a given disease outbreak. 
This, in turn, enables treatment of contagious individuals as well as supporting 
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other restorative actions (e.g., quarantine, vaccination, education, or disposal 
of contaminated sources) that impede further spread of the disease.
• Sharing facilities and expertise needed for identifying the cause, analyzing 
conditions favorable for propagation, and developing remediations for 
disease outbreaks. Such investments are invariably better amortized 
over a larger population and/or a broader collection of locales. Moreover, 
the diversity intrinsic to larger regions can be helpful in understanding 
underlying mechanisms and possible means of control.
• Assessment of the scope of an outbreak which enables predictions that then 
can inform selecting responses well matched to the urgency of a problem. 
Also, over the long term, information about the scope of outbreaks fuels 
research, informs policy decisions, and helps in formulating educational 
efforts that further reinforce prevention and response measures.
However, information sharing of public health data occurs in the context of 
complex commitments to other values—particularly individual privacy and 
maximal participation in the health care systems—that are, at times, in tension 
with public health information needs. If not carefully considered, information 
sharing activities will be undermined by individuals and/or their healthcare 
providers who feel compelled to take evasive measures in order to limit the 
collection of sensitive information.
The following guidance currently being observed for public health information 
sharing reduces such problems and encourages participation:
• Resist the temptation to collect exhaustive information and only seek 
information (or information at a level of detail) that is necessary for 
implementing effective policies and programs.
• Provide communities with information they need to understand and, when 
relevant, make decisions about participating in programs that involve 
collection and use of public health information—including specifications 
regarding the purpose and use of data collection and assurances of 
confidentiality.
• Make information held by public health institutions available in a timely 
manner, consistent with relevant mandates, and resource constraints.
• Protect the confidentiality of information that can bring harm to an individual, 
community, or organization, and limit disclosures to instances where there 
is high likelihood of significant harm to the individual or others.
Of course, the elements that make up these guidelines are sometimes in 
conflict. Seeking and making information accessible in order to facilitate 
community decision‑making can erode individual privacy, for example. It also 
can harm the wellbeing of individuals or communities that will suffer economic 
losses if a contagious disease or genetic condition becomes associated with 
a particular group by location or ethnicity.
Public health surveillance does not require overt patient consent for collect‑
ing and sharing incident data (thereby violating one widely accepted tenet 
of privacy) within the system, since doing so would add an administrative 
burden to healthcare professionals and potentially slow a reporting process 
where timeliness is crucial for slowing the spread of a new communicable 
disease. Rather, individuals and medical professionals are bound by social 
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contract and a duty to inform the state when an individual’s health implicates 
the wellbeing of others. The collective need to know about a contagious dis‑
ease is directly at odds with a patient’s individual right to privacy. Collectors 
and holders of an individual’s data are required to employ policies, practices, 
and mechanisms that will protect the confidentiality of an individual’s health 
information to mitigate the privacy lost from the surveillance.
Reporting, minimization, and decentralization are common elements in the 
public health data collection landscape. Legal frameworks, institutional 
policies and practices, and technical approaches to data sharing reflect 
preferences for keeping identifiable and granular data in the hands of the 
initial collector rather than pooling it. Adherence to these principles erects 
practical barriers to the misuses or repurposing of public health data at scale; 
now, multiple systems must be compromised or multiple entities convinced 
if a shift in use is to occur. And when breaches or shifts in use do occur, the 
limited nature of the data often reduces the potential for harm.
At times, though, public health goals do require sharing identifiable informa‑
tion in ways that allow officials to link this data to other datasets or to identify 
persons with a specific disease or health condition. In almost all cases, this 
identifiable data is only maintained at the level where the intervention occurred, 
which is usually the state or local level.6 In limited cases, such as a rare disease 
outbreak or certain high‑risk disease surveillance programs, identifiable data 
may be shared with other jurisdictions or reported to federal agencies in order 
to enable public health activities. For example, within the HIV/AIDS surveillance 
system, experts 7 support the routine sharing of some data with identifiers in 
order to resolve duplicate case counts across states and territories, so data 
quality may be assured at a national level.8 But when identifiable data must be 
transferred, means are employed to limit risk—encryption, replacing identifiers, 
etc. Earliest feasible de‑identification is especially important.
4. Monitoring and Information Sharing 
to Promote Cybersecurity
Information sharing has figured prominently in recent policy proposals, and it 
is a core feature of a new U.S. law to improve cybersecurity. These provisions 
are motivated by a belief that information currently unavailable to relevant 
parties is necessary for certain cybersecurity‑promoting activities. However, 
the activities that policymakers want to facilitate are often left unclear. Some 
activities that would be enabled are consistent with the Doctrine of Public 
Cybersecurity; facilitating patch development and widespread dissemination 
is an example. Other information sharing, such as helping law enforcement to 
prosecute bad actors, would not be consistent in that it promotes deterrence 
rather than prevention or risk management. Shared information, however, 
could reveal private communications, associational interests, the physical 
whereabouts and movements of individuals, other personal details, and it 
might also disclose confidential information about companies’ networks, 
policies, and proprietary interests. In short, information sharing is often in 
tension with privacy, and with other values.
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Today’s cybersecurity environment boasts a wide range of information shar‑
ing activities. Some, like industry‑specific Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs) and the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US CERT), are long‑standing and supported by the government to pro‑
mote sharing between trusted communities, industry‑specific partners, and, 
sometimes, even the public. Others have arisen independently in response 
to specific threats, and they are largely the outcome of private decisions by 
security practitioners and their employers. Some are aimed at improving 
specific products; others focus on sharing best practices or on identifying 
and managing attacks. We briefly examine below some existing efforts, to 
highlight their relationships to public cybersecurity goals.
Sharing Information about Vulnerabilities. There is a rich market (white hat 
and black hat) for information about vulnerabilities and exploits. Vulnerabil‑
ity reward programs (VRPs), also known as “bug bounties”, incentivize the 
reporting of information to organizations (often software vendors) so that 
patches can be developed. These programs are designed to promote disclo‑
sure to those in the position to develop patches, because discovered—but 
unreported—vulnerabilities may be sold on the black market as zero‑day 
exploits (an exploitable software vulnerability unknown to the vendor). The 
effectiveness of these programs is debated; vulnerabilities often command 
a higher price on the black market, so the best ones might get sold to the 
wrong party. In addition, some argue that commercialization of vulnerability 
information limits the availability of data for security researchers, and thus 
it is an unwise course.
Vulnerability reporting that leads to the development and installation of patch‑
es serves a robust preventative function. However, the need for coordination 
and the lack of a uniform policy regarding public release of information about 
vulnerabilities can detract from its utility. Moreover, acting to patch vulnera‑
bilities comes with trade‑offs for the affected company and its customers. A 
vulnerability made public—even where accompanied by a patch—facilitates 
reverse engineering by attackers seeking to create exploits against unpatched 
systems. There are also reasons an end‑user might delay applying a patch. 
First, installation of a patch takes time and interrupts on‑going operations. 
Second, after a patch has been applied, the resulting system might not exhibit 
identical behavior, which could disrupt operations.
Sharing Information about Best Practices. Regulatory models that formally 
adopt or refer to industry‑generated security standards indirectly encourage 
information sharing about security best practices. Incident response organ‑
izations designed to coordinate action or facilitate a response to a security 
compromise also advise about recommended security practices. US‑CERT 
centers focus on disseminating relevant threats and vulnerability information 
to targeted parties. They also publish recommended best practices, so that 
these can be used widely.
Sharing Information about Threats and Risks. In 1998, U.S. Presidential De‑
cision Directive 63 (PDD‑63) identified distinct industries and called for the 
private sector in each to set up Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs) to mitigate risk and promote effective responses to adverse events, 
including cyberattacks. Organizing around industry sectors facilitated 
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more‑specific information exchanges about vulnerabilities, threats, and iso‑
lated incidents. Exchanging security information does have risks, such as 
loss of competitive advantage, market share, and stock market value from 
negative publicity. Still, members benefit from industry‑specific information 
exchanges that assist in prevention efforts, vulnerability identification, and risk 
management. And, information sharing about emerging and existing threats, 
particularly before they have been exploited within an industry, can bolster 
prevention‑related activities. Furthermore, after an exploit has been fielded, 
information sharing assists in coordinating action to manage the resulting 
insecurity of vulnerable systems.
Sharing Information to Manage and Respond to Vulnerabilities and Threats. 
Successful coordination for mobilizing the response to an imminent threat 
requires sharing information. In the past, the mechanism often has been an ad 
hoc working group of researchers and practitioners. For instance, individuals 
from Microsoft, ICANN 9, domain registry operators, anti‑virus vendors, and 
academic security researchers spontaneously formed the Conficker Work‑
ing Group 10 to contain and blunt the effectiveness of an aggressive worm 
that threatened the Internet in 2008. In an incident in 2008 that highlighted 
a design vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), engineers at 
Google had to coordinate and collaborate quickly with technical personnel 
who administered the Internet infrastructure across the world to respond and 
correct a censored link that effectively blocked worldwide access to YouTube. 
This rerouting from the Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE) was not intended to 
spread beyond national borders, but quickly undermined key Internet infra‑
structure technologies and required rapid international information sharing 
to correct the mistake and keep the Internet functioning as expected.11
Although such information sharing groups have succeeded, there is wide‑
spread agreement that government involvement could further facilitate the 
process to ensure that an organized response occurs and assist with re‑
sources (financial, information, or logistical support). Researchers have noted 
other weaknesses, too, in the cybersecurity information‑sharing landscape, 
including the difficulty of obtaining data in a timely and consistent format, 
organizational and policy challenges associated with disseminating vulnera‑
bility disclosures, and inattention to the privacy risks associated with sharing 
relevant data.
Sharing Information about Breaches of Certain Personal Information. Nearly all 
U.S. states have adopted security breach notification (SBN) laws that require 
companies—and often government agencies as well—to inform individuals, 
and sometimes relevant state agencies, when certain unencrypted personal 
information has been accessed by unauthorized parties. In theory, these 
notifications could assist individuals in avoiding entities with lax security 
practices, and they provide more comprehensive information about risks to 
personal information to aid all institutions in shaping their security investments 
and assist policymakers in identifying areas of market failure. In practice, 
the laws are not fully effective in any of these areas: the shared information 
is insufficient for individuals to make judgments about the relative security 
practices of entities, and the information is often not detailed enough and not 
pooled to facilitate analysis and learning by effected entities or policymakers. 
However, even in its imperfect state, the SBN laws have motivated entities 
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to take steps—such as encryption and improved data management—that 
improve the security of certain personal information by preventing breaches 
and facilitating quick responses where they occur. Despite the security gains, 
entities are reluctant to share information about breaches in the absence of a 
legal obligation, because doing so can lead to regulatory actions, law suits, 
reputational damage, and market devaluation. Even where law suits are un‑
successful—as they have often been in the U.S. due to difficulties proving 
harms considered cognizable for standing or relief—the fear of liability and the 
cost of defending against suits make entities reluctant to share information 
about breaches absent a legal mandate to do so.
5. The Public Health Analogy Revisited 
for Cybersecurity Information
The public goods nature of cybersecurity suggests that proposals for mon‑
itoring and sharing cybersecurity information could benefit from existing 
policies and protocols for monitoring health and sharing that information. 
This, because in both public health and cybersecurity, information sharing 
has the potential to compromise privacy and reveal other confidential infor‑
mation about a principal (a person or an institution) that, if divulged, could 
have economic or other undesirable consequences for that principal.
Yet there also are some important differences. First, disseminating information 
about vulnerabilities can aid attackers, whereas disseminating information 
about a disease is unlikely to further an epidemic. In fact, because cyberse‑
curity information often can be weaponized, international sharing will require 
protocols that have not been needed for sharing health data. Second, health 
information has considerably narrower scope than the transactional data that 
information systems handle. This makes it harder to predict the privacy risks 
from divulging transactional data and, thus, more attention is required for 
need‑based collection, data minimization, de‑identification, and confidenti‑
ality protection. Third, the timescale of cyber incidents warrants attention in 
information sharing initiatives. The extent to which malicious behavior can 
alter the timing of a vulnerabilities’ impact—from hoarding zero‑day attacks, 
to delayed exploitation of personal financial information—warrant attention, 
as does the rapid timescale at which information must be shared to be maxi‑
mally useful in prevention or mitigation efforts. Finally, there is a matter of trust 
in institutions. At least in the U.S., governments are not trusted to manage 
information about people’s day‑to‑day activities. This problem might best 
be handled if data is collected and stored in a way that no one entity has a 
full view of the data. Bringing analysis tools to the data rather than data to 
the government for analysis may offer a more viable solution.
From what public health and cybersecurity have in common, certain princi‑
ples currently employed for sharing health information would have obvious 
applications for cybersecurity.
• Decisions to collect and share information should be tied to the production 
of cybersecurity and/or the management of its absence.
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• Limitations should be prescribed to ensure that collected data cannot 
be used against data subjects for adverse purposes unrelated to the 
production of cybersecurity and/or the management of its absence.12 
• As much cybersecurity data as possible should be made open and 
accessible for public use. Data that cannot be made open should be 
made accessible through limited data access mechanisms and special 
use agreements.
• Coordination must also be considered at multiple levels, including globally. 
Just as public health officials work together through various organizational 
and governmental entities to share information—despite concerns about 
potential weaponization and other misuse—there is a need to consider 
what public cybersecurity information sharing activities may be appropriate 
at an international scale.13 
While government plays a central role in the public health area, it is unclear 
whether that is appropriate for cybersecurity, given the distribution of exper‑
tise, spectrum of industries involved, and diversity of data implicated (best 
practices, vulnerabilities, threat indicators, malware, incident reporting, etc.). 
There is an obvious role for the governments to play in coordination and 
agreement on standards for data to be reported. It also is well suited to help 
orchestrate how stakeholders partition the financial burdens of monitoring and 
information sharing. Finally, it must lead conversations about cybersecurity 
goals, otherwise information sharing, and other means, are likely to advance 
private rather than public needs, and the protections for other values and 
rights in these efforts.
The need for coordination is complicated by various factors though. First, 
being a relative newcomer, cybersecurity lacks a hierarchy of agencies at the 
various levels of government, so it will be difficult to distribute responsibilities 
for surveillance, aggregation, and information sharing. More importantly, 
cybersecurity incidents lack clear geographic distinctions, and much useful 
data is in private (not public) institutions. So multiple industry sectors and 
state and federal agencies will need to coordinate.
6. Final remarks
The Doctrine of Public Cybersecurity is focused upon society rather than on 
any one individual. Yet it is vital that data collection and research activities 
respect the individual. There doubtless will be trade‑offs between the rights 
and autonomy of individuals, versus benefits to the collective. Within public 
health, monitoring and information sharing has advanced specific goals and 
outcomes. The same is likely to hold for information about cybersecurity. But, 
making that case requires articulating those goals, their connection to specific 
kinds of information sharing activities, and ensuring appropriate protections 
for privacy and other competing values are built in.
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